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We analyze the long-term effects of divesture and ownership change on corporate per-
formance. We employ a unique data set for a large number of Czech firms spanning the 
period 1996–2005. We employ a propensity score matching procedure to deal with en-
dogeneity problems. Our results, which are generally in line with the positive effects of 
divestiture found in the developed-market literature, show that the initial effects of di-
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 Divide and Privatize: Firms Break-up and Performance 
1 Introduction 
The literature on corporate divesture in developed countries has provided considerable 
evidence of their positive effects. Research on financial outcomes has documented in-
creases in firm value and returns after divestiture (e.g. Hite and Owers, 1983; Miles and 
Rosenfeld, 1983; Schipper and Smith, 1983; Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge, 1993; 
Montgomery, Thomas, and Kamath, 1984; Borde and Aigbe Akhibe, 1998), while the 
literature analyzing economic performance finds that divestiture improves firm per-
formance and produces various positive distributional effects (e.g. Hausman, Tardiff, 
and Belinfante, 1993; Slade, 1998; Woo, Willard, and Daelenbach, 1992; Daley, Me-
hrotra, and Sivakumar, 1997; Cho and Cohen, 1997; Hanson and Song, 2003; Dittmar 
and Shivdasani, 2003). Still, there are some gaps in the current research. First, the re-
sults of much of the existing literature are based on analyses that often do not account 
for ensuing changes in ownership structure and the potential endogeneity of divestiture 
and privatization (ownership) with respect to post-divestiture performance. Second, the 
majority of the existing research looks at developed economies while the effects of di-
vestitures in emerging markets are largely under-researched (e.g. Makhija, 2004; Om-
ran, 2004; Bartel and Harrison, 2005; Shin, 2008; Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar, 
2009). In the present paper we aim to tackle both of these issues. 
Specifically, in this paper we contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we an-
swer the question of how divestitures affect the long-term economic performance of 
firms in an emerging market. Second, we answer this question while accounting for 
endogeneity issues by employing propensity score matching.
1 Propensity score match-
ing and DID estimation complement the classical instrumental variables (IV) approach 
that cannot be used to study medium- and long-term effects because of the lack of 
proper instrumental variables. An identification strategy using p-score matching during 
the pre-privatization and pre-divestiture periods is better equipped to address endogene-
ity issues along with the attrition problem. 
Moschieri and Mair (2008) argue that our understanding of divestiture is still limited: 
it is not clear whether divestitures are undertaken to correct past development, to affect 
future course, or as a response to the business cycle. Despite this, recent history shows 
that divestitures in emerging markets occur on a larger scale as they are often connected 
with subsequent privatization, restructuring and changes in ownership structure. 
D’Souza, Megginson, and Nash (2007) show that restructuring and changes in corporate 
governance are important determinants of post-privatization performance. In this re-
spect divestitures create economy-wide phenomena, producing very large data sets ideal 
for empirical research. In this paper, we use a large firm-level data set from an emerging 
market economy that in 2004 became a member of the European Union (EU). A wave 
of divestitures that were followed by privatizations occurred in the Czech Republic in a 
way resembling a natural experiment. Firms without any divestitures existed during the 
                                                 
1 In our approach we consider firm divestiture as the “treatment” variable and by estimating the medium- 
and long-term effects of divestiture we study the average treatment effect on the treated subject (ATT). 
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same period and constitute a control group. In our analysis we estimate the effects of 
divestitures on corporate performance and contrast the results with the control group. 
We exploit this set-up and analyze the rich data set from this new European Union 
member state (the Czech Republic). We analyze the effect of divestitures and subse-
quent changes in ownership structure, a feature that is frequently missing in the litera-
ture. However, ownership changes were shown by Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge 
(1993) and Bartel and Harrison (2005) to be important. We also investigate the short- 
versus long-term effects of divestitures as these have been documented to be important 
(Cho and Cohen, 1997) but they have not been thoroughly researched yet (Moschieri 
and Mair, 2008). Finally, we contribute to the debate on methodology by employing 
propensity score matching estimators. 
Divestures became important in European emerging markets in the early 1990’s be-
cause they became a way to restructure large state-owned conglomerates. In this sense 
divestitures served as a first step of restructuring done by the government in the spirit of 
Roland (1994), who discussed restructuring and privatization policies along with their 
pace and sequencing.
2 Following privatization, further restructuring of firms was left to 
the new private owners. In this context, it may be hypothesized that divestitures im-
prove corporate performance as the new firms strive to establish themselves on the mar-
ket and to improve corporate governance. Further, as the originally underdeveloped 
legal and institutional framework improves in emerging market economies, divestitures 
and certain types of corporate ownership may enhance performance by eliminating dis-
economies of scale and by serving as a disciplining device for management.
3 Alterna-
tively, divestitures may have a negative effect on the performance of the divested units 
because of substandard corporate governance, weak government coordination and regu-
lation, unclear property rights, and the underdeveloped legal and institutional frame-
work that existed in emerging market economies. 
Although divestiture is an important phenomena in emerging market economies, sur-
prisingly little research has been produced in the context of the new EU members. A 
recent contribution by Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2009) provides evidence of 
generally positive effects in divested Czech firms, but detailed results vary across the 
new owners. The limitation to this contribution is that it covers only the two-year period 
following the privatization of divested firms. Thus, a key value-added of the present 
paper is that we cover the whole decade, a long enough period to uncover the medium- 
as well as long-term effects of divestiture. In the paper we show that even more than 
five years after the divestiture, the effects of divestiture were still positive. However, 
the effects in subsequent years turned out to be negative and later insignificant as the 
number of observations was reduced substantially by the end of our sample in 2005. 
                                                 
2 Roland (1994) voiced his restructuring and privatization arguments in the early stage of the economic 
transformation in Europe but only now we are able to assess the implications. 
3 The theoretical model developed by Chemmanur and Yan (2004) is relevant in this setting because it 
shows how divestitures might increase the probability of a takeover by value-improving management that 
enhances operating performance after the divestiture. 
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we outline the institutional setting 
underlying our analysis. In Section 3 we present our data, variables and the method for 
identifying divestitures. Section 4 describes our estimating framework. We present our 
empirical results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. 
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2 The Institutional Setting 
In this section we outline the main features of the institutional setting underlying the 
surge of divestiture in our data set. The divestitures took place during the period 1991–
1992, prior to the launch of the mass privatization scheme, also known as voucher pri-
vatization.
4 Hence, in the early 1990’s the government managed a wave of swift divesti-
tures, rapid privatization of divested units, and ownership transfer to new private own-
ers. At the same time the country progressed at a remarkable pace with macroeconomic 
liberalization in every aspect. The process of divestiture and subsequent privatization 
was unexpected, rapid, and exogenous because the decisions to privatize and even the 
specific design of the programs were dictated by politics and not performance criteria 
(Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994). 
Divestitures are the primary issue in our paper, while the privatization process itself 
forms a backdrop and is of secondary importance. The privatization process was very 
fast and homogenous in that all important large and medium firms were privatized 
without primary concern for what the gains for the state might be. Privatization was to 
eradicate in the quickest possible way public ownership as this was associated with a 
communist ideology.
5 
The decisions on divestitures were taken by the relevant government ministries in 
conjunction with the government privatization authority.
6 The decision for each firm 
was based on the winning privatization project that outlined the proposed framework for 
the divestiture(s). On average almost 9 projects were submitted per firm (the median 
was 5); the projects were approved at an average rate of close to 3 per firm (the median 
was 2). Since management was required to submit a privatization proposal, about 25% 
of all projects came from this source. Independent bidders that wanted to privatize by 
purchasing (a part of) a firm submitted two-fifths (39%) of all projects.
7 All proposals 
were to be considered on an equal footing by the privatization authorities, which 
                                                 
4 A detailed description of the privatization mechanism is to a large extent irrelevant with respect to our 
analysis. In the present paper we describe only the features essential to our analysis. For more details on 
the privatization process see e.g., Kočenda (1999), Hanousek and Kočenda (2008), and Estrin et al. 
(2009), among others. 
5 Shleifer and Treisman (2005) show that privatization was very successful from the political point of 
view almost from the outset. However, Hanousek and Kočenda (2008) and Kočenda and Hanousek 
(2009) show that state control over privatized firms was considerable and persisted well beyond the com-
pletion of privatization. 
6 Privatization of each state-owned firm was decided on the basis of an officially accepted privatization 
project. According to the law, all state-owned enterprises were selected either for the first or the second 
privatization wave or they were temporarily exempted. Each selected firm had to submit an official priva-
tization proposal that was usually crafted by the firm’s management under the tutelage (and responsibil-
ity) of its sectoral ministry. Any domestic or foreign corporate body or individual was allowed to present 
a competing project that was to be considered on an equal footing with the official one. 
7 Further details are beyond the scope relevant for this paper. They are available in Hanousek, Kočenda, 
and Svejnar (2009). 
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worked with the investors to ensure that the final submitted proposals reflected at least 
in part government objectives in terms of ownership structure and other characteristics. 
Following the surge of divestitures, the divested firms, at that time transformed into 
joint-stock companies, were privatized during 1992–1993 in the voucher scheme. The 
voucher scheme was part of the large-scale privatization process and two waves of 
voucher privatization took place in 1992–93 and 1993–94. The early post-privatization 
ownership structure emerged as shares from the first and second wave were distributed 
in 1993 and early 1995, respectively. There was also significant post-privatization share 
trading (often off the official stock market) among large shareholders during 1995–1996 
(for details see Hanousek and Němeček, 2001). 
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3 Data, Identification of Divestitures, and  
Definitions of Variables 
We deviate from the standard sequencing and introduce our data prior to describing our 
model: this set-up enables a better flow of exposition. The data originate from the wave 
of corporate divestitures orchestrated by the Czech government in the early 1990’s. The 
data were compiled by Aspekt, a commercial database, and from the archives of the 
Ministry of Privatization and the National Property Fund of the Czech Republic; their 
pre-divestiture descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 later in this section. The 
data allow us to identify unambiguously the parent enterprises and all new units related 
to a surge of divestitures that occurred in 1991–1992. Altogether 44 large enterprises 
were broken up into 130 new firms, the result of the numerous divestitures.
8 Along with 
these 130 newly created firms, we also have data on 780 firms that did not experience 
any divestiture and constitute our control group. The firms in both groups were subse-
quently privatized in the first wave of the voucher scheme.
9 
The institutional setting described in Section 2 has strong implications for data qual-
ity. Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) showed that the decision to pursue mass priva-
tization and even the specific design of the programs were largely dictated by politics. 
This is also consistent with the imperative of politicians losing control in privatized 
firms voiced by Roland (1994) and Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996). Hence, the 
early wave of divestitures followed by the subsequent privatization of divested units 
were primarily a tool to prevent the revival of communist economic ideas rather than a 
profit-making enterprise for the state. Later privatizations of the residual state property 
in the 2000’s were more directed towards maximizing gains. Finally, based on the sub-
sequent identified ownership structure available from our data, we assign each firm with 
an ownership corresponding to the following categories of owner: the state, an indus-
trial firm, an individual owner, or a financial company. 
For each firm in our data set, we have detailed information derived from all the pro-
posed privatization projects that were submitted to the government before privatization. 
This includes the relevant information about the divestiture, the links between the par-
ent company and divested units, the privatization scheme, and information on assets, 
liabilities, profit, sales, and number of employees in 1990. Table 1 displays pre-
divestiture economic indicators in 1990 for the new units, parent firms and firms in the 
control group. A key observation is that divested firms were more capital-intensive and 
less labor-intensive than non-divested firms. A striking difference can also be observed 
in the number of privatization projects submitted for divested firms, which greatly ex-
                                                 
8 These new firms received new tax identification numbers and had the same rights to use the brand 
and/or trade name of the former parent enterprise. Originally there were 131 new firms but we use only 
130 of them since for one divested firm no relevant data covering the period under research are available. 
9 In this scheme altogether 988 firms were privatized. This means that there are only 77 firms (8% of the 
total) for which the data are dubious due to legal problems associated with privatization and we do not 
include them in our sample. Due to the high percentage of firms not experiencing divestiture and a com-
plete set of firms with divestitures there is virtually no truncation involved in our case. 
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ceeds that for non-divested firms. This difference points to greater interest in divested 
firms and bigger expectations for them on the part of potential investors. For many en-
terprises there were several privatization projects submitted and their number was di-
rectly and primarily related to the number of divisions within each firm or the number 
of units into which a firm could be naturally divided. Each privatization project re-
flected the structure of the firm, managers’ motives, degree of investor interest, and 
expected future performance of the firm. However, prior to divestiture and privatization, 
the non-divested firms exhibit better performance measured by scaled profit and sales 
than divested firms.
10 
Finally, we illustrate in Figure 1 performance developments in both divested as 
well as non-divested firms after divestitures and privatization were put into effect. We 
present four indicators of corporate performance: operating profit per share to show 
unit performance from the shareholders’ perspective, operating profit per equity to 
allow for changes in capital structure, profit over staff costs to provide a perspective 
on differences in cost effectiveness among firms, and finally a value-added as a com-
plementary standard productivity measure. All performance indicators introduced 
above are recorded on a yearly frequency. In Figure 1 we present graphically the de-
velopment of the four indicators during the post-divestiture and post-privatization 
period (1996–2005) for all firms for which data are available in a given year in our 
sample. In this figure we also contrast the average development of the four indicators 
between divested and non-divested firms. In terms of profit indicators, we observe a 
stable upward trend that is most pronounced for profit per share and staff costs and 
less pronounced in the case of profit per equity. In both upward trends divested firms 
also record higher performance than non-divested firms, especially in terms of the 
labor productivity measure. All the profit measures exhibit some degree of seasonal-
ity with a sharp drop in 1999 that echoes the poor economic performance and the 
country’s negative aggregate growth in 1998. Other ups and downs are likely to re-
flect less-than-complete reporting by firms rather than economic reasons. Primarily, 
in later years we observe a sizeable drop in the number of observations for both di-
vested and non-divested firms. The fact that some firms are not recorded in our panel 
data set in later years are: a) because of being acquired, b) due to bankruptcy proce-
dure, or c) simply because those firms were no longer required to regularly publish 
their annual income statements by law and thus failed to do so. Unfortunately, we 
were not able to fully distinguish those reasons. Finally, the value-added indicator 
shows consistently better performance of divested firms over non-divested ones, al-
beit with a considerable drop during the period 2001–2005. 
To conclude, a series of positive performance findings at first glance show the su-
perior position of the divested firms during the whole period under research. This 
observation should be viewed with great caution, though. Developments of the per-
formance indicators are presented for all firms for which data were available in a 
given year. Hence, these are raw data that have no way to present a true picture in 
                                                 
10 Let us note that domestic accounting standards in early years of transition reflected more the produc-
tion side of business activities rather than corporate profits. However, since we compare firms within the 
same industrial sector the possible discrepancies are minimized. 
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which the endogeneity of divestiture and ownership change with respect to perform-
ance could be properly processed and accounted for. This task will be performed in 
the next step. First we introduce our methodology (Section 4) and then empirical find-
ings (Section 5). 
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4 The Estimating Framework 
4.1 General Outline 
From the methodology perspective a divestiture represents a treatment that is present in 
a group of divested firms but that is absent in a control group of firms without a divesti-
ture history.
11 Since divestitures and subsequent changes in ownership structure may be 
correlated with firms’ unobserved characteristics, the explanatory variables related to 
divestiture and ownership have to be treated as endogenous. The endogeneity issue re-
lated to this very surge of divestitures has been dealt with by Hanousek, Kočenda, and 
Svejnar (2009), who modeled corporate performance as a function of the presence or 
absence of a divestiture and the type of ownership structure. Since the explanatory vari-
ables related to divestiture and ownership structure were found to be endogenous, they 
used instrumental variables in their estimation.
12 In particular, they used a logit equa-
tion to model the divestiture of a company and subsequent changes in its ownership 
structure, with the explanatory variables being predetermined and exogenous with re-
spect to the divestiture and privatization. This regression-based approach is suitable 
provided adequate instruments are available and the time span is adequate. 
                                                
However, as the time span of the data sample grows longer and the time distance 
from divestiture becomes longer, many new effects come into play on top of the divesti-
ture itself (e.g. new owners, restructuring, change of corporate focus or even change of 
core competence). This means that with the time elapsed the original IVs become less 
accurate to correctly account for the endogeneity of divestiture. Further, the estimation 
set-up may also become more complicated due to potential data attrition. As time goes 
on some firms may fail to report data or even completely disappear. Then, it is natural 
that as less data becomes available, the estimation and identification of the desired ef-
fects becomes less accurate and meaningful. 
For the reasons articulated above we use in our analysis propensity score matching 
and DID estimation instead of the classical IV approach. This allows us to correctly 
study the medium- and long-term effects of divestiture on corporate performance. Fur-
ther, an identification strategy using p-score matching during the pre-privatization and 
pre-divestiture period can also better address endogeneity issues together with the data 
attrition problem when compared with the IV technique. This is because we are inter-
 
11 In a similar fashion Jurajda and Stancik (2009) consider foreign takeover of the Czech firms as a treat-
ment and analyze its effect on firm performance. 
12 Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2009) used the following IVs: the number of privatization projects 
submitted to the government in 1991, the extent of how much the size of each firm deviates in 1990 from 
the standard size of a firm in a specific industry in the OECD economies, the ownership structure pro-
posed in 1991 in the winning privatization project (expressed in percentage intended for a particular 
ownership type), the profitability of the parent firm prior to privatization and divestiture (in 1990), and 
the total number of shares per parent firm in 1990 (eg. total assets). The effects of variables such as the 
firm’s distance from the mean OECD size, profitability, and total number of shares may be nonlinear and 
a Taylor series expansion of the second and third orders were used to formulate a specification that took 
into account potential nonlinearities. 
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ested in the effect of divestiture; other influences are of secondary interest but we still 
control for them. In the case of p-score matching the proper evaluation of the impact of 
divestiture on the performance of a firm involves speculation about how this firm would 
have performed if it was not divested (see Roy, 1951 and Rubin, 1974 for earlier refer-
ences). The matching approach in the context of our research is based on the idea of 
comparing the performance of treated versus non-treated firms (e.g. divested versus 
non-divested ones) based on characteristics common to them. Specifically, matching 
estimators are based on pairing divested firms with those that did not experience dives-
titure and that have similar observable characteristics. Pairs of treated and non-treated 
firms with similar characteristics are then used to interpret the difference in their post-
treatment performance as the divestiture (and subsequent ownership) effect. 
In a formal way we will use the standard approach to evaluate the treatment effects 
of a firm’s divestiture. As it becomes standard, we employ a binary treatment indicator 
DIVi that equals one if firm i was divested and zero otherwise. The potential firm per-
formance is then defined as Yi(DIVi) for each firm i in the sample, where i = 1, … N and 
N denotes the total number of observations. 
The parameter that has been widely used in the evaluation literature is the so-called 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is defined as: 
      (1)  11 [ | 1] [ | 1] [ | 0] ATT E treatment DIV E Y DIV E Y DIV == = = − =
The ATT thus measures the difference in the potential performance of a divested 
firm in two states of being and not being divested. Because we do not observe the coun-
terfactual mean for divested firms, we have to define an appropriate alternative for it as 
E[Y1| DIV = 0] in order to estimate the ATT. A widely used strategy is to assume that for 
a given subset of observable variables X that are not affected by divestiture, the poten-
tial firm outcome is independent of treatment indicator Di. In the seminal paper 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest to use so-called balancing scores to overcome the 
dimensionality problem in X. The independence of a potential outcome given a set of 
variables X is then transferred to conditional independence on a balancing score b(X). 
The propensity score P(DIV = 1|X) = P(X), i.e. the probability for a firm to be di-
vested, given its observed covariates X, is the suitable balancing score. The propensity 
score (p-score) is then formally defined as 
   (2) 
Using the propensity score, the p-score estimator for ATT can be written as 
  , 
or in simplified notation, 
   (3) 
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The time index t indicates the sequencing and proper variables used: divesture hap-
pened at time t, conditioning for p-score matching is done on pre-divestiture firm charac-
teristics (Xt-1) and the evaluation of ATT several periods after the divestiture. Basically, the 
ATT
PSM estimator is nothing but the mean difference in firm performance over the com-
mon support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of matched 
firms. Under such assumptions the matching method results in an unbiased estimate of the 
treatment impact such as firm divestiture; for more discussion of the treatment effect see 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) or Smith and Todd (2005), among others. 
Despite the fact that the literature on matching estimators considers several kinds of 
estimators, the ATT
PSM defined in (3) that uses a difference-in-differences (DID) match-
ing technique is considered a superior estimator.
13 The DID matching estimator allows 
for temporally invariant differences in outcomes between treated and control (non-
treated) units that may arise (Smith and Todd, 2005). The property that the DID match-
ing estimator eliminates time-invariant differences in performance between divested 
and non-divested firms is counterbalanced by the fact that the DID matching estimator 
is more data-demanding and requires the use of longitudinal data before and after treat-
ment and a suitable set of conditioning variables for pair matching. 
Since we employ panel data we greatly benefit from the DID matching estimator’s 
quality. Further, we use a set of conditioning variables—i.e. firm pre-divestiture charac-
teristics such as the size of the firm, industrial sector, pre-split (and pre-privatization) 
performance indicators, along with some proxies for the future ownership structure—
that satisfy the required conditions. Therefore, in the present paper we employ propen-
sity score matching that fully accounts for the outlined endogeneity and is well suited 
for our purpose due to the longitudinal character of our data. 
 
 
4.2 Our Estimation Approach 
As mentioned in the previous section, we estimate the causal average effect of treatment 
on the treated, i.e. the effect of divesture on divested firms. In the above outline Yj is a 
measure of the corporate performance of firms divested during 1991–1992 (j=1, DIVt = 
1) or firms that were not divested (j=0, DIVt = 0). The period when we compare firm 
performance covers the years 1996–2006; the initial period t0 refers to 1996, after the 
post-privatization changes in ownership structures were settled. Our estimator of inter-
est ATT introduced in (3) therefore reflects the difference in performance between the 
current (t0+k) and initial period (t0). Similar to other matching studies, we perform the 
matching of firms within the same industrial sector. 
First, it is possible to estimate the causal effect of divestiture on firm performance by 
assuming that divestiture is as good as random conditional on observed characteristics 
                                                 
13 The literature on matching estimators considers several kinds of matching algorithms, which leads to 
different estimators with particular properties like a) nearest-neighbor matching, b) caliper matching, c) 
kernel matching, or d) local-linear matching. 
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among the firms that have a similar predicted probability of being divested 
, where t denotes the time of divestiture. Then, the causal 
effect is defined as the difference between the average performance of firms over k 
years (denoted as  ) that were divested and the hypothetical 
counterfactual performance of the same firms had they not been divested (denoted as 
). The probability of being divested (the propensity score) is 
assumed to depend on a set of pre-divestiture (as well as pre-privatization) observable 
characteristics. The fact that we are able to use for matching pre-divestiture firm-
specific variables, whose values were set by central planners independently of what 
firms would subsequently do in a market setting, makes them quality-conditioning vari-
ables. The variables used in estimating p-scores represent measures of the sizes, indus-
trial sector, and scaled performance of firms. Specifically, we consider the probability 
of divestiture as the function where we consider various functional forms of size (log of 
     (4) 
capital, capital, and capital squared), industrial sectors, and pre-divestiture indicators 
represented by sales per share (s_tns) and profit per share (p_tns). To capture the future 
ownership structure we consider the proxies derived from privatization projects: the 
proportions of assets held by investment privatization funds (ipf) and municipalities 
(munic). With these two variables we control for the initial ownership structure intended 
for privatized firms. In addition we also employ a relative excess employment variable 
(DEi) to control for differences in firm size. In logit specification we also use some of 
these variables squared. In Table 2 we list all the observables introduced above. The 
financial and economic characteristics are easy to understand and we provide the neces-
sary intuition for the rest of the variables below. 
The relative excess employment (DEi) variable and its construction corresponds to 
the fact that central planners tended to establish and maintain very large firms, both 
because it was easier to control a few large (rather than many small) firms and because 
of the prevailing political philosophy to build large firms under a command regime. 
Thus, relative excess employment (DEi) is a matching criterion that measures the num-
ber of employees in a firm in 1990 minus the number of employees in a (weighted) av-
erage firm belonging to the same industrial sector in the OECD economies in the same 
period (see Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales, 1999).
14 
                                                 
14 We take the mean OECD firm size as a benchmark because the transition countries declared their com-
mitment to move towards a standard market economy and many, including the Czech Republic, succeeded 
in joining the OECD in 1995, soon after the start of the transition. One of the determining factors for a dives-
titure is therefore likely to be the size of the firms that emerged from the centrally planned system, relative to 
the size of firms in established market (OECD) economies. Since the socialist planners preferred large firms, 
the relative employment variable (DEi) captures effectively the excessive size of enterprises under central 
planning relative to the firm size in market economies and serves as a matching variable. 
The DEi variable can also be understood as an instrument for divestiture. We run our matching procedure 
without this variable but the results (available upon request) were not materially different as we primarily 
control for the size of the company and industrial sector, which indirectly corresponds to the definition of 
DEi. 
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Finally, the proportions of assets held by investment privatization funds and munici-
palities are proxies for corporate governance. Investment privatization funds held sub-
stantial stakes in privatized firms, pursued profitable opportunities, and were also found 
to engage in defensive restructuring by reducing employment (Hanousek, Kočenda, and 
Svejnar, 2007). Hence, they are taken as a proxy for the extent of corporate governance. 
Municipalities received various ownership stakes as free property transfers and became 
stakeholders in numerous companies, mainly in utilities and transportation, but being a 
part of the state ownership structure they did not pursue an overly active role in the 
companies (Kočenda and Hanousek, 2009). They are then taken as a proxy for weak 
corporate governance. 
For all observables listed in Table 2 we provide marginal effects along with the p-
value of the marginal effect for each variable. To capture the possible heavier tail distri-
bution we primarily employed a logit model, however, we also checked that a probit 
model yields very similar results. Since the purpose of estimating equation (4) is classi-
fication rather than estimation of underlying structural coefficients, the optimal choice 
of the underlying functional form is not the issue (Smith, 1997). 
The estimated p-scores are later used to control for influential factors in the score 
matching procedure. We can derive several key observations from the table. The size of 
the firm measured by the log of capital is a key factor behind divestiture occurrence. 
The marginal effect shows that the bigger the firm the greater the probability that dives-
titure will occur.
15 A similar observation can be made for marginal effects associated 
with other variables. However, in most cases the effect is economically marginal. Fi-
nally, based on relatively high values of R
2 and stable results across different specifica-
tions we conclude that the employed variables adequately characterize firms for the 
propensity score matching procedure. 
                                                 
15 We also include the results of p-score estimation, where we exclude different measures of firm size. 
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5 Empirical Results 
We present our results in Tables 3 and 4. For estimation we used STATA 10 and spe-
cifically we employ the standard procedure psmatch2 implemented by Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003), considering both nearest-neighbor and kernel matching. Standard errors 
were obtained using bootstrapping methods. An additional STATA procedure, pstest, 
was used for covariate imbalance testing. 
First we show performance results measured in terms of operating profit scaled by 
number of shares issued and operating profit scaled by firm’s equity (Table 3). Scaling 
by shares helps to put the performance indicator into the perspective of gains for money 
invested by shareholders. The second measure complements the information on per-
formance by accounting for changes in capital structure as equity may change often 
over time. Further we use profit over staff costs as a measure of labor productivity and 
finally a value-added as a complementary standard productivity measure (Table 4). 
In Tables 3 and 4, after the column with time span, in the first two pairs of columns 
we present the average treatment effect on treated firms (ATT) along with the statistical 
significance of the effect. As before, treated firms are those that experienced divestiture. 
The average treatment effects on treated (divested) firms show time-dependent positive 
or negative differences in the performance of divested firms with respect to the per-
formance of non-treated (non-divested) firms. For example, in 1996 divested firms re-
corded a profit over share that was 0.039 times larger than the profits of non-divested 
firms. In the same year the profit over equity of divested firms was 0.628 times larger 
when compared with non-divested companies (Table 3). Profit over staff costs were in 
1996 1.587 times larger and the value-added was 6.035 times larger when compared 
with non-divested firms (Table 4). In 1997 the effects related to the profit over share 
and profit over equity are even larger than in 1996, while the profit over staff costs and 
value-added are smaller but still positive and statistically significant. The situation 
changes afterwards. 
The observed effects presented in Tables 3 and 4 produce a clear trend. At the begin-
ning of the researched period divested and privatized firms exhibit better performance 
than non-divested firms. This positive difference gradually increases for a limited pe-
riod of time and quickly reaches its peak around 1997–1998. During the subsequent 
stage the positive differences become negative when statistically significant values are 
available. For the rest of the observed period values become mostly negative, albeit 
without being statistically significant. Therefore, judgment has to be made carefully as 
the numbers of observed data for both divested and non-divested firms were dropping 
considerably in the later years of our sample. In any event, from what we observe, the 
effect of divestiture rapidly dissipates. 
The values of the observed effects in Tables 3 and 4 are based on the large total 
number of matched observations between treated and non-treated firms, e.g. the total 
number of firms that were exposed to matching (shown in the column labeled N). Fur-
ther, we show the number of divested firms used for matching that were successfully 
matched with non-divested firms based on a set of matching indicators (shown in col-
umn N treated matched). Finally, we show the number of non-divested (control) firms 
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used for matching (shown in column N controls matched). The ratios between the total 
number of firms used for matching (N) and the number of divested matched firms (N 
treated matched) vary over time. In the majority of years these ratios exceed 10%. In 
many years they are well below 50%, though. Thus, the range of these ratios suggests 
that the common support problem could be a relevant concern in these data. For this 
reason, we perform a thorough check of the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 to assess 
how well the propensity score did to balance observables across the matched divested 
(treated) and non-divested (control) firms. We perform a series of balancing tests, e.g. 
the two-sample t-tests suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The results of the 
balancing tests are presented in Table 5. The key finding of our balancing tests is shown 
in the last column, which records the p-values of the test for the treated and control 
groups. Bold p-values for matched variables clearly indicate that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of the equality of treated and control groups for all compared variables. 
Hence, there is no systematic difference in the distribution of covariates after matching. 
Moreover, the results of our estimations presented above are based on variables that 
were tested to be exogenous.
16 Our results (Tables 3 and 4) are then based on a cor-
rectly specified procedure as well as an appropriate selection of variables. 
                                                 
16 Results of the tests are not presented but they are available upon request. 
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6 Conclusions 
We analyzed the effects of corporate divestures and ownership changes on firm per-
formance in an emerging European market. We employed a unique data set for a large 
number of Czech firms over the period 1996–2006. In our analysis we accounted for 
ensuing changes in ownership structure due to privatization and the endogeneity of per-
formance with respect to divestiture and privatization. Regression-based techniques 
often suffer from a lack of so-called “common support” when the characteristics of 
firms divested differ from those that were not broken up. Therefore, we employed a 
propensity score matching procedure that fully accounted for endogeneity and was well 
suited for our purpose due to the panel character of our data. 
Our results show that five years after the wave of divestitures took place the effects 
of divestiture are positive. However, later on, after the post-divestiture and post-
privatization events settled down, the primarily positive effect of divestiture dissipates 
very fast and in two to three years (from the beginning of our sample) it becomes nega-
tive or statistically indistinguishable (Tables 3 and 4). These results are in contrast to 
the development of post-divestiture and post-privatization positive performance ob-
tained from raw data (Figure 1). The reason behind this difference centers on the use of 
a proper procedure that accounts for the endogeneity of divestiture and ownership 
change with respect to performance. In order to verify our results we performed proper 
balancing tests to show that our results are based on a sound procedure employing an 
adequate set of variables. 
In general, our results are in line with the positive effects of divestiture found in the 
literature covering developed markets. However, we show that within five to seven 
years after divesture and even sooner after subsequent privatization these effects disap-
pear. 
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Appendix 
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics for Selected Pre-divestiture and  





Mean  Std. Devia-
tion  Minimum Maximum 
Divested 130  640 4330 15.8  49,200 
Not divested  780  301  748  2.2  9,390 
Capital in 
millions of 
CZK  All firms  910  350  1770  2.2  49,200 
Divested 130  822 1907  23 17880 
Not divested  780  1156  3049  3  49701 
Number of 
employees 
All firms  910  1108  2915  3  49701 
Divested 129 0.89 4.28  -16.94  30.95 
Not divested  778  1.05  6.29  -15.59  90.38 
Profit per 
share 
All firms  907  1.02  6.04  -16.94  90.38 
Divested 130 11.73  32.97  0.01  266.17 
Not divested  779  12.10  41.52  0.00  461.36 
Sales per 
share 
All firms  909  12.05  40.39  0.00  461.36 
Divested 130 13.48  18.68  1.00  77.00 
Not divested  780 2.96 4.38 1.00  41.00 
Total 
number of 
projects  All  firms 910 4.46 8.92 1.00  77.00 













              
 
 
Table 2   P-score Estimation 
variable dy/dx z  P>z  dy/dx z  P>z  dy/dx z  P>z  Mean  (X) 
lnc -5.26E-02  -2.50
b 0.01       -5.45E-02  -2.79
a 0.01 11.75 
tns  4.59E-08 1.03  0.30 4.32E-08 0.93  0.35        3.47E+05 
tns2 -2.72E-15  -0.69  0.49  -5.80E-15  -1.43  0.15        4.10E+12 
s_tns  5.51E-04 0.99  0.32 9.08E-04 1.64  0.10
c 5.62E-04 1.10  0.31  11.37 
p_tns  -3.08E-03 -0.73  0.47 -3.45E-03 -0.79  0.43 -3.11E-03 -0.73  0.47  1.10 
ipf -3.38E-08  -0.16  0.88  -3.05E-07  -1.58  0.11  1.19E-07  1.14  0.26  1.37E+05 
excess_e  -2.20E-05 -1.25  0.21 -2.80E-05 -1.55  0.12 -2.23E-05 -1.27  0.21  388.15 
municip  -1.54E-03 -0.13  0.90 -2.50E-03 -0.21  0.83 -2.32E-03 -0.20  0.84  1.00 
(ipf)^2  4.13E-14 0.59  0.56 1.18E-13 1.65  0.10
c 5.61E-16 0.03  0.98 2.80E+11 
(municip)^2  9.98E-04 1.30  0.19 1.04E-03 1.28  0.20 1.02E-03 1.35  0.18  11.51 
(excess_e)^2  4.11E-10 0.67  0.51 5.66E-10 0.91  0.36 4.22E-10 0.69  0.49 1.20E+07 
  R2=0.127    R2=0.117    R2=0.126       
Number  of  observations  670    670    670     
Notes: The table contains the marginal effects for each variable (i.e., derivatives dy/dx). The variable _pscore denotes p-score matching, lnc stands for ln(capital), tns and (tns)^2 
denotes the total number of shares and this variable squared, respectively; s_tns and p_tns stands for sales and profit per share. The variable ipf denotes the number of shares held 
by investment privatization funds; the variable excess_e corresponds to the mean excess of the number of employees with respect to similar firms in OECD countries. The 
percentage of shares originally transferred to municipalities is captured by the variable Municip. Finally, variables (ipf)^2 and (municip)^2 captures the results for quadratic versions of 
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Table 3   ATT Results for Operational Profit over Total Assets and Equity 
Operational Profit over Total Assets 




1996 0.039    1.80
b 694  87  607 
1997 0.074    2.09
c 671  79  592 
1998  -0.038 -3.40
c 636  78  558 
1999 -0.021  -1.65
b 579  71  508 
2000 -0.021  -0.15  197  9  188 
2001 -0.013  -0.07  188  9  179 
2002  -0.027  -0.22 187  9  178 
2003  0.003   0.29  179  9  170 
2004  -0.021  -0.06 167  8  159 
2005  -0.033  -0.63 146  6  140 
 
 
Operational Profit over Equity 




1996 0.628  1.72
b 693  87  606 
1997 0.699  2.91
c 670  79  591 
1998  0.066 0.47  634  78 556 
1999 -0.060  -2.16
c 579  71  508 
2000 -0.122  -1.81
b 197  9  188 
2001 -0.202  -1.50  188  9  179 
2002  0.018  0.21 187  9  178 
2003  0.016  0.21 179  9  170 
2004  -0.022  -0.21 167  8  159 
2005  -0.072  -0.67 146  6  140 
Note: As usual, ATT denotes the average treatment effect on treated, i.e., the effect of the particular variable on di-
vested firms. T-stat is the corresponding t-statistics, N denotes total number of observations, and N treated matched and 
N controls matched denote the number of matched divested firms and the number of matched non-divested firms, re-
spectively.  
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Table 4   ATT Results for Operational Profit over Staff Costs and Value Added 
Operational Profit over Staff Costs 




1996 1.587  2.07
c 496  81  415 
1997 1.378  1.54  474  76  398 
1998  -0.550 -0.45  442  72  370 
1999 -0.717  -1.98
c 383  68  315 
2000 -9.705  -8.41
c 84  7  77 
2001 -0.266  -1.15  68  2  66 
2002  -2.952  -0.05 77  4  73 
2003  0.016  0.09 72  7  65 
2004  -5.760  0.70 62  5  57 








1996 6,035    0.42  501  81  420 
1997 3,210    0.20  482  79  403 
1998  -2,584 -0.12  448  73  375 
1999 -2,452  -0.09  384  68  316 
2000 -82,848  -0.56  84  7  77 
2001 -67,574  -0.74  82  4  78 
2002  -45,740  -0.36 80  5  75 
2003  -4,693  -0.04 76  7  69 
2004  -10,936  -0.07 71  8  63 
2005  -15,874  -0.11 48  2  46 
Note: As usual, ATT denotes the average treatment effect on treated, i.e., the effect of the particular variable on di-
vested firms. T-stat is the corresponding t-statistics, N denotes the total number of observations, and N treated matched 
and N controls matched denote the number of matched divested firms and number of matched non-divested firms, 
respectively.  
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_pscore Unmatched  0.20 0.12  51.1  35.36  0.000 
 Matched  0.14  0.13  3.9  92.4  0.35  0.730 
Lnc Unmatched  11.59  11.71  -9.3    -4.16  0.000 
 Matched  11.54  11.65  -8.9  4.2  -0.58  0.562 
Tns Unmatched  6.40E+05  3.00E+05 11    8.34  0.000 
 Matched  2.80E+05  2.80E+05 0  99.9  0.00 0.997 
(tns)^2 Unmatched  1.90E+13 6.50E+11  12.3    9.98  0.000 
 Matched  5.00E+11  5.90E+11 -0.1  99.5  -0.14  0.890 
s_tns Unmatched  11.73  12.11  -1    -0.40  0.689 
 Matched  11.48  10.15  3.6  -258.9  0.23  0.819 
p_tns Unmatched  0.89  1.05  -2.9    -1.10  0.269 
 Matched  0.87  0.75  2.2  22.6  0.20  0.843 
Ipf Unmatched  2.10E+05  1.30E+05 11.3    8.08  0.000 
 Matched  1.30E+05  1.30E+05 0.6  94.4  0.09  0.926 
excess_e Unmatched  -302.94  630.86 -25.6    -11.70 0.000 
 Matched  285.00  31.50  6.9  72.9  0.54  0.592 
Municip Unmatched  2.40 0.59 42   28.07  0.000 
 Matched  1.00  0.81  4.5  89.3  0.41  0.680 
(ipf)^2 Unmatched  1.20E+12 8.80E+10  12.8    10.33  0.000 
 Matched  1.50E+11  1.00E+11 0.5  96  0.37  0.711 
(excess_e)^2 Unmatched  1.50E+07 1.20E+07  3.40    1.37  0.170 
 Matched  5.50E+07  1.60E+06 3.60  -14.6  0.88  0.382 
(municip)^2 Unmatched  39.45 3.95  37.1    28.35  0.000 
 Matched  9.95  8.16  1.9  95  0.24  0.807 
Notes: The variable _pscore denotes p-score matching, lnc stands for ln(capital), tns and (tns)^2 denotes the total num-
ber of shares and this variable squared; s_tns and p_tns stands for sales and profit per share. The variable ipf denotes 
the number of shares hold by investment privatization funds; the variable excess_e corresponds to the mean excess of 
the number of employees with respect to similar firms in OECD countries. The percentage of shares originally trans-
ferred to municipalities is captured by the variable Municip. Finally, the variables (ipf)^2 and (municip)^2 capture the 
results for quadratic versions of ipf and municip, respectively. 
The last column shows the comparisons of treated and control groups; bold-type p-values clearly indicate that we can-
not reject the null hypothesis of the equality of treated and control groups for all compared variables. 
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Figure 1   Prost-divestiture and Post-privatization Performance Trends. 
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